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1A Humanities of Resistance
Fragments for a Legal History of Humanity
Costas Douzinas∗
I first realized that there was something strange about the term “Humanities” when,
as the director of my university’s Humanities Institute, I participated in a meeting
to set up a European Consortium of Humanities Centers. Except for the host
center in Utrecht and mine, no other participating European university had a
Humanities Institute. The aspiring founding fathers and mothers came from single
disciplines: Archeology, English, Dutch, Media, and Philosophy. Then it struck
me: No proper or widely used term translates the term Humanities in Greek or
Italian, their supposed mother tongues. The Humanities, despite their desperate
look eastward and backward, are a consummately modern and decidedly American
invention. No faculties, courses, or centers for the Humanities existed in European
universities until recently. The few British exceptions – of which my own institution
is a shining example – do not follow a long tradition of Humanities education. They
are, rather, the result of our “special relationship” with our transatlantic cousins
and of the managerial culture that has replaced the older genteel governance of
universities, and is perennially trying – and on thewhole failing – to create economies
of scale, grant-producing interdisciplinary initiatives, and a teaching, scholarship,
and evaluation culture that rather pathetically imitates the marketplace.
What are the Humanities? According to the flourishing American debate, the
Humanities have been defined in two related ways. They are either a set of academic
subjects that typically consists of Classics, Philosophy, History, and Literature (the
disciplinary approach) or an attitude toward teaching and learning that could be
extended to all types of subjects (the humanistic approach). Humanities subjects
are linked through a common origin, through their shared object of concern, or
through the use of common strategies.
The Classics had initially pride of place in the enumeration of Humanities disci-
plines. “As late as 1918 . . . the word humanities and the phraseGreek and Latin [were
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used] as synonyms.” Ullman reported in 1946 that in Scotland, “a professor of Latin
is called a professor of humanity.”1 The 1934 edition of Webster’s dictionary defined
the Humanities as “the branches of polite learning regarded as primarily conducive
to culture; esp., the ancient classics and belles-lettres.” As the sciences gradually
became dominant in universities and wider society and the emphasis on the classics
started waning, the definition became negative and parasitical on the Humanities’
competitors. A number of reviews conclude that the Humanities “are whatever sci-
ence is not.”2 The once mighty humanities have now a reduced kingdom, “a musty
place filled with tombs, monuments, libraries, and talkative old guides who stroll
around with their hands in their pockets, wearing glasses and out of touch with
reality, conducting you for a small fee to the graves of Beethoven, Shakespeare, and
Sophocles.”3
At the other end, the attempt to defend the Humanities against the onslaught of
the “soulless” scientificmentality emphasizes the humanistic tradition and extends it
“to embrace whatever influences conduce to freedom,”4 or, even more grandiosely,
to the study of “the sum total of man’s activities.” The Humanities chart “greatness,
monumental scale, fineness of artistic sensibility, and deep insight” as they examine
“the nature of human experience as an object of awareness, and the nature of human
acts as both content of awareness and events observed.”5 In this second sense, every
scientific endeavor and object of study can be approached humanistically. These
claims are grand on the surface. Yet the Humanities seem to be in perennial crisis,
which has generated a huge literature defining its contours and principles, defending
its standing in relation to other fields, in particular the sciences, and even discussing
the role of the Humanities in wartime. The repetitive and occasionally embarrassed
tone of the debate indicates, however, that the stakes are lower. They are a last-stance
defense of themodest kingdom of university Humanities and a shield to protect their
“small fee” in the form of fast-diminishing research funds.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the Humanities as an academic institution
are closely associated with American education. The long debate about their scope
and value, indeed about the meaning of the term Humanities is linked with the
survey course in Literature and History degrees. Such courses were first introduced
at Stripps College and Stephens College in 1928 and at Chicago in 1931. The
Chicago Humanities course was widely publicized and “probably has done most to
1 B. L. Ullman, “What are the Humanities” 17/6 Journal of Higher Education 301, at 302 (1946).
2 James Schroeder, “The Enemy Within” in 25/8 College English 561(1964); cf. “If ‘the humanities’
indicates a set of nonrelated subjects, then it would include those areas that could not be classified
under the sciences,” Walter Feinberg, “To Defend the Humanities” 3/2 The Journal of Aesthetic
Education 91 (1969).
3 Shroeder, ibid.
4 Ralph Barton Perry, “A Definition of the Humanities” in The Meaning of the Humanities (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1938), 4.
5 Richard Kuhns, 1/2 The Journal of Aesthetic Education 7 (1966), 12, 15.
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associate the term humanities with a survey course.”6 The pedagogical value and
organization of the different disciplines into a single subject inwhich “everythingwas
dumped in” is a mainstay of the debate.7 The Great Books or the dead-white-men
tradition inHumanities survey courses has been criticized frommany directions. The
relationship between these bucket courses and their constituent disciplines is uneasy;
the compilation course dumps down the disciplinary expertise and undermines the
independence and integrity of the disciplines. Still the term Humanities seems
to refer either to federal administrative and financial arrangements (Humanities
Faculties or Schools) or to “from Plato to NATO” survey courses that form the
backbone of liberal arts education.
In genealogical terms, theHumanities are asmuch the product of pedagogical and
disciplinary concerns of American educationalists as of the Classic and Renaissance
humanistic tradition. Against this background, interest in law and literature and,
recently, law and the humanities takes additional importance. What is the link
between these two disciplines that, on first look, are miles apart?
Lawwith Humanities
In 1943, while World War II was raging, Roscoe Pound, perhaps the greatest
American legal theorist, penned a remarkable article entitled “The Humanities in
an Absolutist World.”8 Pound wrote at a point when the rift between the Western
powers and the Soviet Union, which would dominate the postwar period, had
become all too evident, and he finds many shared pitfalls between what he calls
autocracies and Western autocratic democracies. Pound is scathing about the
emerging new era of materialism and consumerism; of “unmanageable bigness”
in government; of obsession with power, security, and “grandiose schemes of world
organization” the West promotes. One would be hard pressed to improve on this
list of evils for our world today.
Pound draws a sharp line between the sciences and the Humanities. Unlike the
standard humanist position, however, he argues that the Humanities are dispensable
and are dismissed for political and ideological reasons. “Men are to be trained in
the physical and natural sciences so as to promote material production. They are to
be trained in the natural sciences so as to promote passive obedience” (pp 12–13). For
that to happen, however, Pound avers sarcastically, “the past is to be cancelled. We
are to begin with a clean slate. Our accumulated control over external nature has
gone so far that there remains only the task making it available for universal human
contentment . . . The causes of envy and strife are to go with want and fear. Mankind
6 Ullman, op. cit., 304.
7 Ibid., 303.
8 Roscoe Pound, “The Humanities in an Absolutist World” in XXXIX/1 The Classical Journal (October
1943), 1. Page numbers in the next part of the text refer to this article.
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will settle down to a passive enjoyment of the material goods and will neither require
nor desire anything more” (pp 2–3).
Humanities is a last-stance defense against the imposed ignorance and philistinism
that must cancel the past to usher in the new era of consumerism, absolutism, and
apathy. A generation cut off from its past cannot fully understand and criticize the
present. TheHumanities help develop a historical and critical approach; they can be
used to resist the all-out attack of utilitarian materialism. This is precisely why they
must be downgraded, why a clean slate is necessary. Choosing to base his defense
on the importance of learning the classical languages rather than literature, Pound
castigates those who find the study of the classics a waste when “time is needed for
the natural and physical sciences which teach us how to harness more of external
nature to producing thematerial goods of human existence and to the social sciences
which are to teach us how these goods are to be made to satisfy desires” (p 9).
Pound dispels any suspicion of prejudice against the social sciences and a facile
recapitulation of the “two cultures” argument. He proudly declares that he taught
jurisprudence from a sociological perspective for forty years but adds curtly that the
social sciences “do not impart wisdom; they need to be approached with acquired
wisdom,” which only the Humanities offer. Throughout the essay, the argument
remains deeply political. “If we are content to seek nothing more than a general
condition of undisturbed passivity under the benevolent care of an omnicompetent
government, we can well leave education to the sciences which have to do with
providing the material goods of existence and those [social sciences] which teach us
how the government secures or will secure them for us” (p 14).
For Pound it is a question of resisting a certain type of autocratic government that
bases its power on the biopolitical manipulation of desire (his preferred pejorative
term is “contentment”) through the production and consumption of material goods,
in the hope that this would end strife. Pound correctly anticipates the move toward a
disciplined hypercapitalism in which material success becomes the sole aim in life.
Citizen contentment can be achieved only after the blind satisfaction of material
wants has been raised into the goal of individual and state and has been accompanied
by a governmentally promoted political apathy. The role of science is central: The
natural sciences develop new ways of using material resources for the production
of goods while the social sciences manipulate the psyche and install political and
cultural passivity.
This is a scathing attack not so much on science as on the politics and ideologies
that Pound rightly feared would dominate the postwar period. Coming from a
patrician culture steeped in the Greats, Pound finds in the Humanities and the
Classics, in particular, strategies of resistance against this catastrophic turn. Law
is not discussed explicitly but the essay is full of references to legal learning and
scholarship. Without a good understanding of the Greek and Latin languages and
culture, law could fall into the same predicament as the wider culture. Pound
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castigates the uneducated, almost illiterate students who cannot read the Bible or the
Magna Carta in the original, do not understand the meaning of proceedings in rem
or mistake son assault demense for Anglo-Saxon and non compos mentis for French
(pp 10, 11). We are all used to tales of student ignorance and examination script
gems. If I were to argue today that law students should have a passable knowledge of
Latin (I am often tempted to do so), I would be laughed out of court and my radical
credentials would suffer irretrievably. Pound must have been the last American to
do so.
Palpable elitism and an antidemocratic whiff color these examples. The Human-
ities make the human but their work must be done before university in families,
schools, and on Main Street. One either has humanity or not; it is a matter of birth,
early education, and class. Pound’s defense of classical education sounds occasion-
ally anachronistic and even reactionary, but there is also a melancholy finis Austriae
tone throughout the essay. Pound’s classical education will not survive. The cultural
barbarians are at the gates; resistance is both necessary and impossible. Yet its tenor
differs from later defenses of theHumanities. TheClassics are a bastion of resistance,
a last-ditch defense against rising political apathy and oppressive state omnipotence.
Their gradual displacement accompanied by the idiotic assertion that only the sci-
ences are necessary for democracy will make intelligent Americans “bow the knee
to Baal” and “sink into materialistic apathy” (p 14). This is a lament and obituary for
a dying patrician world but also a battle cry against the looming biopolitical turn of
postwar culture.
Some sixty-five years after Roscoe Pound’s wartime cry of despair and pessimism,
the question of the role of the Humanities has returned to the cultural and edu-
cational agenda as the present volume attests. Have his Cassandra-like predictions
come true? Can the Humanities play the role he assigned to them in 1943? What
can a humanistic education offer the young student and aspiring lawyer at a time
when humanism and the values of liberalism and democracy have allegedly tri-
umphed? Is it possible today to remain loyal to Pound’s injunction and develop a
new Humanities of resistance?
Two recent essays address these issues, giving almost opposing answers to the
question of the relationship between the Humanities and Law. Martha Nussbaum’s
“CultivatingHumanity in Legal Education” and Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson’s
“Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship”9 share much in their diagnosis
of the state of legal education. Although Nussbaum gives a rather timid defense of
the Humanities, Balkin and Levinson dismiss any substantial link.
Nussbaum, a classicist and historian of ideas turned law professor, has consis-
tently promoted the role of the Humanities in education and legal education in
9 Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson, “Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship”, 18 Yale
Journal of Law and the Humanities 155 (2006).
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particular.10 For Nussbaum, the Humanities mission is extremely broad. They
address the problems of “how to live with dignity as a rational animal, in a world
of events that we do not fully control. Issues . . . of vulnerability and need, of terror
and cruelty, also of pleasure and vision.”11 Such a huge agenda is delivered through
three core values: Socratic self-examination, world citizenship, and the narrative
imagination. The first refers to a reflective approach to self and tradition closer to
Habermasian liberal orthodoxy than to classical Greece. Students should be taught
to defend sound values and criticize those that do not stand the test of delibera-
tion. They should learn to “reason logically, and to test what one reads or says for
consistency of reading, correctness of fact, and accuracy of judgment.” Second, the
Humanities should prepare for world citizenship, a rather fashionable oxymoron in
the post-1989 world. Nussbaum, a key promoter of neo-Kantian cosmopolitanism,
wants to cultivate the humanity of citizens and their ability to see themselves as not
simply citizens of some local region or group but also, and above all, as human
beings bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern. Bonds
of recognition and concern should be built not just with our immediate group but
also with minority cultures and people and with humanity at large. Finally, the
literature and the arts help develop something called “narrative imagination.” This
is the “ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different
from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s story, and to understand the
emotions, desires, and wishes that someone so placed might have” (pp 269, 270).
Turning to legal education, Nussbaum concedes that is a form of specialized
professional training. In a rather amazing admission for a staunch defender of the
Humanities, she accepts that the “values and goals of [humanity] are not germane to
legal education” (p 272). In a further twist of old-style positivism, Nussbaum claims
that students “need to learn the law as is.” Lawyers are out to win, not to fight for
truth, and in this sense they are closer to the Sophists rather than to Socrates.
Yet historically the relationship betweenLaw and theHumanities has been intense
and intimate. All great philosophers, from Plato to Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, andWeber,
either studied the law or had a deep understanding of legal operations. Legal issues
have been central to philosophical and political concerns throughout history. Well
before the creation of the various disciplines, when thinkers wanted to contem-
plate the organization of their society or the relationship between authority and
the citizen they turned to law. Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Ethics, as much
as Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, are attempts to examine the legal aspects of the
10 Martha Nussbaum, “Cultivating Humanity in Legal Education,” 70/1 University of Chicago Law
Review 265 (2003). Page numbers in the next part of the text refer to this article. See also “Humanities
and Human Development” 36/3 Journal of Aesthetic Education 39 (2002). Both essays are applica-
tions of Nussbaum’s wider thesis in Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal
Education (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
11 Nussbaum, “Humanities and Human Development,” 39.
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social bond, to discover and promote a type of legality that attaches the body to the
soul, keeps them together, and links them to the demands of living. Seen from the
perspective of the longue dure´e, the law represents the principle of social reproduc-
tion.Whenever classical philosophy occupied itself with the persistence of the social
bond, it turned to law and became legal philosophy, the great source from which
political philosophy and then the disciplines, sociology, psychology, and anthropol-
ogy, emerged in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively. All major
early modern philosophers were jurists. Thomas Hobbes was preoccupied with the
common law; Leviathan is a clear exercise in jurisprudence. Immanuel Kant, the
philosopher of modernity par excellence, wrote extensively on legal issues and at the
end of his life came upwith a blueprint for a future world state based on international
law and respect for freedom and rights. Hegel andMarx wrote superb jurisprudential
texts but were also well versed in the positive law of their time. Emile Durkheim
and Max Weber, the founders of sociology, wrote extensively on law and used types
of legality as markers for the classification of different social systems. The birth of
the disciplines out of the womb of legal study led to a cognitive and moral impover-
ishment of legal scholarship and education, which have become an entomology of
rules, a guidebook to technocratic legalism, and a science of the existent.
In an essay written in 1993, Nussbaum argued that philosophy should be incor-
porated into legal education because it is necessary for the understanding of key
concepts.12 Free will, the emotions, sexuality, the quest for a good life are germane to
legal questions and only philosophy can clarify them. Following Plato’s Theaetetus,
Nussbaum accepts that philosophy begins in “wonder” and criticizes the use of
“science as normative for legal reasoning,” which places emphasis on the “right
answer.” “[L]et the law students learn to wonder, and then perhaps, wherever they
are, they will feel the pressure of a Socratic question rising up to annoy them as they
are trying to be simple.”13
Yet, by 2003, Nussbaum has accepted the poverty of legal education, and,
against Pound’s injunction, sees the Humanities as just a palliative. Marx classi-
cally described the bourgeois as a split person who goes about his business using and
exploiting people during the working week but who, reverse-Cinderella-like, turns
into a citizen concerned with the common good on the Sabbath. A similar inner split
of the lawyer allows a small role for the Humanities: Lawyers, in addition to being
aggressive litigators unconcerned with truth and justice, are influential citizens.
They should be trained, therefore, into “normative ethical reasoning by examining
alternative accounts of decisionmaking, social justice, and related topics” (p 274).
12 Martha Nussbaum, “The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education,” 45 Stanford Law Review
1627 (1993).
13 Ibid., 1640.
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Nussbaumadmits that these are diversions, adornments, and peripheral-only prob-
lems. In 1993, she had advocated the appointment of philosophers in law schools.
In 2003, the solutions proposed are anodyne. The need to teach ethical reasoning
is partly met by the standard course in legal ethics. Essay writing should replace
the obsession with written examinations; courses in international and comparative
law would encourage a more global and a la mode understanding of the world, and
innovative courses such as the “decisionmaking” one Nussbaum has been teaching
at Chicago would expose students to good normative reasoning and an empathetic
education sentimentale juridique. Nussbaum admits, on the other hand, that her law
and literature course failed in this quest. Students expected a “lighter more enter-
taining” kind of course about the literary representations of legal situations. Law and
the Humanities courses end up entertaining and lightening the heavy load of law
students as well as giving them a useful cultural gloss. A few references to Sopho-
cles, Shakespeare, Melville, and Kafka can impress the professional cocktail party
circuit.
This is humanism of the lightest kind. It has been repeatedly and incisively
criticized, and there is no need to add much here.14 The cosmopolitan self and the
ethical community Nussbaum envisages are too closely modeled on the values and
norms of American liberal elites suitably finessed to extend humanitarian empathy
to the unfortunates of the world. Rational deliberation, ethical reasoning, and a
fictive changing of places do not go far in addressing social inequality, oppression,
and domination. As Rosi Braidotti put it, Nussbaum has claimed “monopoly over
basic values of human decency by allocating them exclusively to . . . American liberal
individualism.”15 As we know, this kind of individualism is often accompanied by
high-altitude bombers and ethically aware torturers.
Martha Nussbaum’s loss of nerve is intriguing. Lawyers are sophists, rhetoricians,
and litigators, people driven, like society, by profit. They try to persuade audiences
at any cost rather than search for the truth. There is not much that can be done to
improve their ethical sense. Nussbaum’s defense of the (limited) role of the Human-
ities in legal education takes therefore a methodological and hermeneutical form.
It is not so much the traditional Humanities that can improve the moral compass of
lawyers but the values they promote. Law should be taught humanistically, helping
to develop a reflective approach, moral values, and critical reasoning.
Roscoe Pound’s prediction has come true: Even the professor of Humanities
concedes that she has little to offer to the cultivation of culture in law. Nussbaum
openly admits it at the end of the essay. Legal education makes “ambitious idealistic
14 Homi Bhabha, “Unpacking my Library . . . Again” in Iain Chamber and Lidia Curti, eds. The Post-
colonial Question (New York: Routledge, 1996); Rosi Braidotti, Transposition (Cambridge: Polity Press
2006).
15 Braidotti, 15.
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young people become narrower, more fixed on narrowly instrumental goals . . . Soon
[the law students] will be out working for firms. Meanwhile, while they are here,
while they have time to deliberate and imagine, let us cultivate their humanity”
(p 279). The role of humanistic legal education is to instill a sense of liberal morality
and openness to the students who come to law school without the elite cultivation
that Pound could still rely on in 1943. The Humanities have retreated from Roscoe
Pound’s agenda: They can offer no resistance to the firm. Could it be, however, as
Roscoe Pound insinuates, that it is precisely the kind of “humanism light”Nussbaum
advocates that leads to the neglect of deliberation and imagination and facilitates
rather than resists the efficient integration of the young lawyer in the mentality of
the firm? Could it be that liberal legal pedagogy has contributed to the predicament
Nussbaum both accepts and regrets? In Roscoe Pound’s terms, the barbarians are
not just amassing at the gates. They have entered the citadel and the guards have
abandoned the fight.
Lawwithout Humanities
If Nussbaum offers a tepid and unconvincing defense of the Humanities, Balkin
and Levinson’s article marks the near abandonment of the ideas and values for
which Pound stood.16 These authors proclaim the realist, pragmatic, and brutal
nature of American legal education. Their attack on Pound’s and Nussbaum’s bien
pensant humanism is twofold. The belief that great works of art conveymoral notions
is wrong. In any case, law’s business is to promote tough-mindedness rather than
moral values. “[L]aw seems almost to relish the extirpation of [tender-heartedness] as
if tender-heartedness were a mental disease that only the discipline of law can cure”
(p 184).
Our authors disagree with Pound in most particulars. The establishment of the
advanced administrative and administered state (Pound’s great fear) has been a great
success. It released the courts from being “insulated oracles of eternal legal verities”
(p 169). Judges, like legislatures and administrators, are now involved in complicated
issues of governance, in the definition of the public interest for all aspects of social
life, and in the implementation of public policy. As a result, economic efficiency has
become the aim of the legal system; economics the most relevant discipline for legal
scholars; law and economics the dominant jurisprudential tradition; the rational
actor approach its methodology and technical internalist legal argument, enriched
by interdisciplinary social scientific expertise, the form of legal education. If they are
right, Pound’s prediction has come true but it is not as bleak as he thought. Against
his fears, these developments are a great achievement of American law, scholarship,
and pedagogy.
16 Balkin and Levinson op. cit., fn. 10. Page numbers in the next part of the text refer to this article.
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The downgrading of the role of the Humanities in legal education is program-
matic, global, and somewhat ironic if not cynical. Lawyers and legal academics are
gladiators (rhetors) out to win battles (arguments) with different audiences. They are
motivated by a strong prescriptive urge. Other disciplines are useful to lawyers only
as aids to victory. This premise determines their cognitive and political function:
legal philosophy’s role is to help legitimate the legal system and clarify its main
concepts; legal history provides useful data for making normative legal and political
arguments (pp 175–6). Interdisciplinary studies are admitted to the extent required
by the prescriptive nature of legal scholarship and a professional, results-oriented
pedagogy. Knowledge of economics helps the lawyer’s quest for scientific authority
and rhetorical persuasion. As Justice Holmes apparently would have put it, “reading
literature or engaging in the humanities [does] not have edificatory effect” (p 186).
Only the study of rhetoric is useful because it improves the forensic skills of litigators.
I have neither the expertise nor the brief to defend American legal education
against this portrayal. I would be surprised if American legal theorists would rec-
ognize (or approve) the image of law and education presented here as an amoral,
gladiatorial, results-driven enterprise that colonizes other disciplines. The authors
could claim that this is a realistic depiction and not their own preference. After all,
they aver in passing that they carry out research in law and poststructuralism, that
they promote law and the humanities, and that they have launched a new field called
law and the performing arts. Yet their own claim is that legal academics see them-
selves as legislators or judges. Lawyers describe in order to prescribe; our authors
are lawmakers because they are legal academics; because they are interdisciplinary
(one has a Ph.D. and the other is a poststructuralist and reads Derrida, ‘a literary
theorist,’ and Deleuze and Guattari); and because, finally, they teach in prestigious
universities.
Balkin and Levinson’s law is crystal clear: A “good lawyer” is a rigorous thinker
who does not waste time denouncing injustice at the expense of legal analysis. The
job of the lawyer is, following the bon mots of O. W. Holmes, to become a supple
tool of power and to help his fellow citizens to go to Hell if that is what they want.
Their job is not “to do justice,” but “to play the game according to the rules . . .”
(p 185). Pragmatism is identified with dominant ideology and a moral grundnorm
that reads “succeed at all costs” – let us call it the “xeroxing” principle.
One of the authors describes an exchange with our editor, who invited him to
help set up a PhD program in law and the humanities. Professor Balkin’s refusal
was monosyllabic: “xeroxing.” He worked in a richly endowed law school and all his
xeroxing was free, whereas our editor had to buy copy cards. “A law department that
cut itself off from the goal of professional education would soon find itself as well
supported financially as the average art history or music department, which is to say,
it would not be very well supported at all” (p 177). This simple morality tale confirms
the prescience of Roscoe Pound. In the sixty-five years since he wrote his article,
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material “contentment” has become the motivation for scholarship, “free xeroxing”
the drive of intellectual life. To be sure, if free xeroxing is the aim of academic life,
it would have been much better for many of us to go into the legal profession and
own the xerox machine itself.
“A favourite phrase of the realist is ‘the brute facts’; a phrase used not in sadness
that there should be such facts, but with a certain relish, as if brutality were the test of
reality . . . the significant things in the world are force and the satisfaction of material
wants”17 wrote Pound in 1943. Balkin and Levinson offer an interesting twenty-
first-century example. Commenting on the infamous torture memoranda drafted by
Justice Department lawyers from the “highest reaches of the elite legal academy” to
legitimize the practices of the American military and give President Bush absolute
power to conduct war, they find little surprising or worrying in this capitulation.
Against Roscoe Pound’s protests, they believe that a Humanities education would
have made no difference. “Acquaintance with Homer and Shakespeare would not
have changed what ambitious young lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel wrote to
please those in power. Even a torturer can love a sonnet . . .” (p 186). To support their
claim theymobilize the humanist judge LearnedHand and the realist O.W.Holmes
who, the authors speculate, would have perhaps agreed with the interpretations of
the elite lawyers. Whether these legendary judges would have concurred with these
counterintuitive interpretations is a moot point. No evidence is given in support,
something that stands at odds with the essay’s proclamations of cool reason and hard
realism. This is the lesser problem nevertheless.
The post-WWIIWestern consensus was that certain acts – torture is prime among
them – are not tolerable in liberal democratic societies. In the West, torture was
declared unacceptable and was discussed as part of a barbaric and long-gone history.
Torture, we were told, takes place elsewhere only, in exotic and evil places, in
dictatorships and under totalitarian regimes. This consensus, however, has now
broken down. Torture has become a respectable topic for conferences on practical
ethics, and the “ticking bomb” hypothetical offers entertainment at dinner parties.
What is particularly disturbing is the way in which lawyers are prepared to enter into
debate about the morality and legitimacy of torture and to develop detailed plans
about ways of legalizing it through torture warrants, sunset clauses, and judicial
supervisory regimes.18 As Lord Hoffman put it in a case examining the legality of
detention without trial in the United Kingdom, “the real threat to the life of the
nation comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.”19 The problem is not
17 Pound, op. cit., 3.
18 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004); Alan Dershowitz,
Why Terrorism Works (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); For a hilarious retort see: John Gray,
Torture – A Modest Proposal in Heresies (London: Granta, 2004), 132.
19 A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, Para 97.
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the torturers who love sonnets,20 but the lawyers and philosophers who are prepared
to dress in legal and moral verbiage the dictates of brutalizing power and the legal
academics who offer scholarly support.
In this world of brute facts, law is technical reason assisted by appropriate sci-
entific expertise at the service of power. References to justice, on the other hand,
are a waste of time indulged by the feeble-minded and the emotional. “It is only
the insufficiently rigorous and well trained, whom legal training has inadequately
‘disciplined’ who think that the solutions to a legal problem is resolved by asking
which result is more just” state our authors ambiguously located between constantive
affirmation and performative irony (p 185). To assert that a legal system is unjust,
says Alf Ross, is an “emotional expression. To invoke justice is the same thing as
banging on the table: an emotional expression that turns one’s demand into an abso-
lute postulate.”21 Nonformal conceptions of justice are “illusions which excite the
emotions by stimulating the suprarenal glands.”22 When “someone says “that thing is
unjust” what he means is that the thing is offensive to his sentiments.”23 This radical
separation of law from justice is, however, both cognitively wrong (deciding what is
lawful is impossible without an evaluation of the moral, just, or desirable outcome)
and morally impoverished (it reduces morality to private subjective choices and/or
to a predication of legality). It became the legitimation and rationalization of the
atrocities of the last seventy years.
Allow me here a little detour that briefly sketches a different approach to the
nexus of law and justice. The eternal return of (new versions of) naturalism despite
its repeatedly proclaimed fallacy indicates that law and morality are not opposed.
They are linked in inner and paradoxical ways. For the Greeks and Romans, justice
was the prime, albeit missing, virtue of the polity and the spirit and reason of law.
A just constitution was a legitimate constitution and a just legal system has a valid
claim to the obedience of its citizens. We find similar ideas in the writings of the
common lawyers. Justice is cumulatively the foundation, the spirit, and the end of
the law. As law’s immemorial and unwritten foundation, justice links the common
law with divine will and its expressions in nature and reason. After the Reformation,
justice as equity is explicitly associated with the divine order and becomes law’s
spirit. When law and justice, in the form of equity, are in conflict, the law must
give way to higher reason. In all these formulations, justice is seen as the “primitive
reason”24 of law, its virtue and ethical substance, an ideal or principle that gives rules
20 As we know of a number of people who tortured prisoners in Guatanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, an
interesting social scientific research project would examine their artistic and cultural preferences and
determine whether certain cultural “memes” lead to torture practices.
21 Alf Ross, On Law and Justice (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958), 274.
22 Ibid., 275.
23 Friedrich von Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 168,
fn 30.
24 Sir H. Finch, Law, or, A Discourse Thereof in Four Books (London: Society of Stationers), 1627, at
fol. 57.
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their aim and limit, and remedies their defects. Justice is also something outside or
before the law, a higher tribunal or reason to which the law and its judgments are
called to account. In this sense, a law without justice is a law without spirit, a dead
letter; it can neither rule nor inspire.
Legal justice is only one limited facet of justice. It misfires and decays if it stays on
its own, unaccompanied by the wider conception that has inspired European critical
legal theory.25 This is a justice that operates in relationship to the other as a singular,
unique, finite beingwith concrete personality traits, character attributes, andphysical
characteristics. This finite person puts me in touch with infinite otherness. Both
inside and outside, justice is the horizon against which the law is judged for its
routine successes and failings and for its broader neglect and forgetting of oppression
and domination. Whether we see the law as an historical institution or as a formal
system of rules and decisions, the deconstruction of its operations discovers the
violence of origins in its daily operations and unravels the ordered bipolarities
(fact-value, public-private, objective-subjective, lawful-unlawful), showing that they
cannot stabilize the legal system.26
The axiomof justice “respect the singularity of the other” is radically different from
our authors’ injunction “be awinner,” “success succeeds,” and get free photocopying.
This principle emerges in theological, philosophical, and literary texts as well as
in the legal archive. It indicates what a Humanities of resistance might look like
today against both liberal beautification and realist simplification of Law and the
Humanities. Unless this or some other defensible principle of justice informs legal
teaching and scholarship, academics become functionaries of power and technicians
of skills accepting our exclusionnot just from theHumanities but fromall intellectual
endeavor and political aspiration.
Fragments for a (Legal) History of Humanity
Three ways of linking law and the Humanities have emerged from the discussion
thus far. TheHumanities can help resist the onslaught of materialism, consumerism,
and an all-powerful state (Pound); they have a limited role in cultivating the moral
and rational abilities of law students (Nussbaum); finally, they have no major role to
play because they can neither help lawyers win arguments nor prepare law students
for the battles ahead (Balkin and Levinson).
Now this seems to me a rather restricted way of pursuing the link. It is associated
more, as argued previously, with the perceived needs of American education rather
25 Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart, 2006) Ch. 1–4.
26 Balkin’s earliest writings were not inimical to these ideas; see Jack Balkin, “Deconstructive Practice and
Legal Theory,” 96 Yale Law Journal 743 (1987). The 1990s made both Nussbaum and Balkin move
toward a more “brutal” pragmatism. The undergraduate character of the Law degree, the relaxed
connection with the legal profession and the enduring influence of the Critical Legal Conference
have somewhat shielded British academics from this trajectory.
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than with the history of the two fields. Indeed even if we were to restrict our search
to the academic aspects of the relationship, the itinerary would be different. It would
first explore philosophy, literature, and law as the oldest forms ofWestern education.
The Greeks, lacking a clerical caste and holy books, learned about their past, their
world, and their Gods from a poet. Homer became the tradition, textbook, and
source of learning for young Greeks, from the sixth century bc – a matter that greatly
annoyed Plato and set up the ongoing ancient quarrel between philosophy and
literature. Poetry – a central case of the Humanities – and the law were from the
beginning the main ways of learning and ruling.
After the Christianization of Europe, the role of philosophy was assumed by
theology. Theology and law were taught to students versed in the artes liberales,
mainly the trivium (grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric), which formed the backbone
of themedieval university. This expertise brought together patristic and secular study
and cross-fertilized them. Bologna, the first European university, was established
in the twelfth century as a law school but it developed out of the liberal arts that
flourished there early in the eleventh century. By the thirteenth century, up to 10,000
students from all over Europe studied in Bologna. After graduating, they went to
work for Church and the nascent state, using their legal expertise to protect secular
leaders from ecclesiastical incursions. The task of these jurists was to extrapolate
from principles of canon law the axioms of a secular legal science, helping develop
on the way the theory of royal sovereignty and legitimacy against papal claims. The
various types of knowledge placed today in the basket called Humanities had an
intrinsic link with law and were the mainstay of education from Classical Greece to
the late pre-Modern period.
Once this longue dure´e approach is taken to the Law–Humanities nexus, the focus
of interest changes. If the two areas are closely linked, the zone of intersection should
be sought in the target of their intervention, the ground concept that unites them.
This is humanity, the human, human nature: a family of concepts and institutions
that have brought together the exploration of man’s civilization, tradition, culture,
and values with the age-old attempt to discipline the subject and regulate the social
bond.
“In the large sense the humanities mean the sum total of man’s activities – nothing
that touches man is alien to the humanities,” wrote John Dodds in 1943 alluding to
Terence’s dictum that “Homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto.”27 If we accept
this expansive definition, the Humanities and human rights, modern law’s noblest
claim, share their concern to address every aspect of humanity. Human rights are
the acme of modern law; they have been created for the sake of humanity. As a
combined term, they draw both from the moral and political tradition of (legal)
27 John Dodds, “Place of the Humanities in a World of War,” Vital Speeches of the Day (March 1943)
311.
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humanism (with its obvious links with the Humanities) and from the institutional
and conceptual empire of law. If according to a standard approach, human rights are
a category of rights given to people on account of their humanity and not because of
any other attributes or belongings, the history, the (contested) concept, andmeaning
of humanity are important normative sources for contemporary law that escape the
parochial nature of jurisdiction.
Liberal philosophy adopts a normative definition of humanity according to which,
in one version, “our species is one, and each of the individuals who compose it is
entitled to equal moral consideration.”28 Yet throughout Western history, the mean-
ing, extension, and scope of humanity has varied wildly. Slaves have been excluded
from humanity and are typically defined as things (res) among others by Aristotle,
the philosopher of philosophers. Pigs, rats, leeches, and insects, on the other hand,
were regularly and formally indicted and tried in law courts in the Middle Ages. In
earlymodernity, companies became recognized as legal persons. A strongmovement
argues today that animals as well as trees, parks, and other natural objects should be
given the protection of rights. The question of humannature has continued to “haunt
modern thought and has become more complicated as a result of the contradictions
engendered by positive science and historicism.”29 My argument is that humanity
has not been a normative attribute shared by all humans, as liberal jurisprudence
asserts, or a universal standard of civilization and distinction, as argued by the aca-
demic Humanities. Despite these important normative claims, humanity has acted
as a strategy for ontological separation, distribution, and classification. Law and the
Humanities share this strategic use. Let us start with a brief history of humanity.
Pre-Modern societies did not develop a comprehensive idea of the human species.
Free men were Athenians or Spartans, Romans or Carthaginians but not members
of humanity; they were Greeks or barbarians but not humans. The word humanitas
appeared for the first time in the Roman Republic as a translation of the Greek word
paideia. It was defined as eruditio et institutio in bonas artes (the closest modern
equivalent is the German word Bildung). The Romans inherited the concept from
Stoicism and used it to distinguish between the homo humanus, the educated Roman
who was conversant with Greek culture and philosophy and was subjected to the
jus civile, and the homines barbari, who included the majority of the uneducated
non-Roman inhabitants of the Empire. Humanity enters the Western lexicon as an
attribute and predicate of homo, a term of separation and distinction. For Cicero
as well as the younger Scipio, humanitas implies generosity, politeness, civilization,
and culture and is opposed to barbarism and animality.30 “Only those who conform
28 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Ideology (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2000).
29 Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society, John Thompson, ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1986), 240.
30 Ullman, op. cit., 302.
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to certain standards are really men in the full sense, and fully merit the adjective
‘human’ or the attribute ‘humanity.’”31
The job of philosophy, literature, and learning is to instill humanitas in the
deserving. Humanity is an acquired taste, a construct, the outcome of education,
edification, and discipline. It marks the distinction between the cultivated man
of letters, the exemplar of real humanity, and the uneducated, uncivilized beings
who, because they lack the subtlety of aesthetic discrimination and judgment, are
lesser humans. These two aspects, the artificial nature of humanity and its use for
separating people have been a mainstay of Western history. The modern quarrel
between the sciences and the humanities, exemplified in the two cultures debate
between C. P. Snow and Leavis,32 in attacks on the culture industry and the society
of the spectacle and the juxtaposition between high and low culture, constantly
reconstructs humanity’s cutting edge. Richard Kuhns argued in 1966 that to be well
educated is to be conversant with a set of great books. Kuhns claims unconvincingly
that “executive cadres trained for our great industries, workers on assembly lines,
businessmen who want to become ‘humanized’ . . . right now as I write are given
training in the humanities which raises in the student beliefs about greatness, about
goodness, about the quality of his contemporary cultural environment,”33 Only the
learned are fully human with the rest falling on a point between barbarism and
animality.
The political and legal uses of humanitas follow a similar history. The concept
of humanity has been consistently used to separate, distribute, and classify people
into rulers, ruled, and excluded. This strategy of separation curiously entered the
historical stage at the precise point when the first proper universalist conception of
humanitas emerged in Christian theology; it was captured in the St. Paul’s statement
that there is no Greek or Jew, man or woman, free man or slave (epistle to the
Galatians 3:28). All people are equally part of humanity because they can be saved
in God’s plan of salvation and because they share the attributes of humanity now
sharply differentiated from a transcended divinity and a subhuman animality. For
classical humanism, reason determines the human: man is a zoon logon echon or
animale rationale. For Christian metaphysics, on the other hand, the immortal
soul, both carried and imprisoned by the body, is the mark of humanity. The new
idea of universal equality, unknown to the Greeks, entered the Western world as a
combination of classical and Christian metaphysics.
The divisive action of humanity survived the invention of its spiritual equality.
Pope, Emperor, Prince, King, these representatives and disciples of God on earth,
31 H. C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1965), 201.
32 See Shroeder, op. cit.
33 Kuhns op. cit., 12. Similarly, Nussbaum reports that the defense of some Classics scholars against
criticisms of irrelevancy is that they prepare good managers.
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were absolute rulers. Their subjects, the sub-jecti or sub-diti, take the law and their
commands from their political superiors. More importantly, people will be saved
in Christ only if they accept the faith because non-Christians have no place in
the providential plan. This radical divide and exclusion founded the ecumenical
mission and proselytizing drive of Church and Empire. Christ’s spiritual law of love
turned into a battle cry: let us bring the pagans to the grace of God, let us make the
singular event of Christ universal, let us impose the message of truth and love upon
the whole world. The classical separation between Greek and barbarian was based
on clearly demarcated territorial frontiers. In the Christian empire, the frontier
was internalized and split the known globe diagonally between the faithful and
the heathen. The barbarians were no longer beyond the city as the city expanded
to include the known world. They became enemies within to be appropriately
corrected or eliminated if they stubbornly refused spiritual or secular salvation.
The meaning of humanity after the conquest of the New World was vigorously
contested in one of the most important public debates in history. In April 1550,
Charles V of Spain called a council of state in Valladolid to discuss the Span-
ish attitude toward the vanquished Indians of Mexico. The philosopher Gine´s de
Sepulveda and the Bishop Bartholome´ de las Casas, twomajor figures of the Spanish
Enlightenment, debated on opposite sides. Sepulveda, who had just translated into
Spanish Aristotle’s Politics, argued, “the Spaniards rule with perfect right over the
barbarians who, in prudence, talent, virtue, humanity are as inferior to the Spaniards
as children to adults, women to men, the savage and cruel to the mild and gentle,
I might say as monkey to men.”34 The Spanish Crown should feel no qualms in
dealing with Indian evil. The Indians could be enslaved and treated as barbarians
and savages to be civilized and proselytized.
Las Casas disagreed. The Indians have well-established customs and settled ways
of life, he argued, they value prudence and have the ability to govern and organize
families and cities. They have the Christian virtues of gentleness, peacefulness,
simplicity, humility, generosity, and patience and are waiting to be converted. They
look like our father Adam before the Fall, wrote las Casas in his Apologia; they are
unwitting Christians. In an early definition of humanism, las Casas argued that,
“all the people of the world are humans and the only one definition of all humans
and of each one, that is that they are rational. Thus all races of humankind are
one.”35 His arguments combined Christian theology and political utility. Respecting
local customs is good morality but also good politics: the Indians would convert to
Christianity (las Casas’ main concern) and also accept the authority of the Crown
and replenish its coffers, if they were made to feel that their traditions, laws, and
34 Gines de Sepulveda,Democrates Segundo ofDe las JustasCausa de laGuerra contra los Indios (Madrid:
Institute Fransisco de Vitoria, 1951) 33 quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America, Richard
Howard, transl. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999) 153.
35 Bartholome´ de las Casas, Obras Completas, Vol. 7 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1922) 536–7.
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cultures were respected. LasCasas’ Christian universalismwas, like all universalisms,
exclusive. He repeatedly condemned “Turks and Moors, the veritable barbarian
outcasts of the nations” because they cannot be seen as “unwitting” Christians. An
empirical universalism of superiority and hierarchy (Sepulveda) and a normative one
of truth and love (las Casas) end up being not very different. As Tzvetan Todorov
pithily remarks, there is “violence in the conviction that one possesses the truth
oneself, whereas this is not the case for others, and that one must furthermore
impose that truth on those others.”36
The conflicting interpretations of humanity by Sepulveda and las Casas capture
the dominant ideologies ofWestern empires, imperialisms, and colonialisms. At one
end, the (racial) other is inhuman or subhuman. This justifies enslavement, atroc-
ities, and even annihilation as strategies of the civilizing mission. At the other end,
conquest, occupation, and forceful conversion are strategies of spiritual or material
development, of progress and integration of the innocent, naı¨ve, undeveloped others
into the main body of humanity.
These two definitions of otherness and strategies toward it are linked with our own
needs and desire: They act as supports of Western subjectivity. The helplessness,
passivity, and inferiority of the undeveloped others turns them into our narcissistic
mirror image and potential double. These unfortunates are the infants of humanity –
ourselves in a state of nascency. They are victimized and sacrificed by their own
radical evil; they are rescued by us who help them grow, develop, and become
our likeness. Because the victim is our mirror image, we know what his interest is
and impose it for his own good. At the other end, the irrational, cruel, victimizing
others are projections of the Other of our unconscious. As Slavoj Zizek puts it,
“there is a kind of passive exposure to an overwhelming Otherness, which is the
very basis of being human . . . [the inhuman] is marked by a terrifying excess which,
although it negates what we understand as humanity is inherent to being human.”37
We have called this abysmal Other lurking in the psyche and unsettling the ego
various names: God or Satan, barbarian or foreigner, in psychoanalysis death drive
or the Real. Today they have become the axis of evil, the rogue state, the butcher
of Baghdad, the beast of Belgrade, and the bogus refugee. They are contemporary
heirs to Sepulveda’s monkeys, epochal representatives of inhumanity.
Becominghuman is possible only against this impenetrable inhumanbackground.
Split into two, according to a simple moral calculus, the Other has a tormented
and a tormenting part, both radical evil and radical passivity. He represents our
narcissistic self in its infancy (civilization as potentia, possibility, or risk) and what
is most frightening and horrific in us: the death drive, the evil persona who lurks in
the midst of psyche and society. Empirical and normative humanity (humanity as
36 Todorov op cit., 166, 168.
37 Slavoj Zizek, “Against Human Rights,” 34 New Left Review 56 (July–August 2005).
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quality shared or as a project to be achieved) will eventually coincide through the
West’s surgical intervention. Either the deceased, unworthy, inferior members will
be cut off or they will be humanized and integrated once they accept the wrong of
their ways and agree to be civilized; severing or prosthesis are the ways of making
human.
The religious grounding of humanity was undermined by the liberal political
philosophies of early modernity. The foundation of humanity was transferred from
God to (human) nature. Human nature as the common denominator has been
interpreted as an empirical fact or as a normative value or both (Habermas). Science
has driven the first approach. The mark of humanity has been variously sought in
language, reason, evolution, or its upright posture (the etymological meaning of
anthropos). It was legal and political innovations, however, that turned humanity,
man as species existence, into the common and absolute value around which the
whole world revolves. The great eighteenth-century revolutions and their declara-
tions paradigmatically expressed the modern universalistic conception of humanity.
Yet at the heart of this new universalism, humanity remained a strategy of division
and classification.
We can follow briefly this contradictory process that both proclaims the universal
and excludes the local in the text of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen, the manifesto modernity. Article 1, the progenitor of legal universalism,
states, “men are born and remain free and equal of right,” a claim repeated in the
inaugural article of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Equality and
liberty are declared natural entitlements, independent of governments, epochal,
and local factors. Yet the Declaration is categorically clear about the real source of
universal rights. Article 2 states, “the aim of any political association is to preserve the
natural and inalienable rights of man.” Article 3 proceeds to define this association:
“The principle of all Sovereignty lies essentially with the nation.”
Natural and eternal rights are declared on behalf of the universal man; however,
these rights did not preexist but were created by theDeclaration. A new type of politi-
cal association, the sovereign nation and its state and a new type of man, the national
citizen, came into existence and became the beneficiaries of rights. In a paradoxical
fashion, the Declaration of universal principle established local sovereignty. From
that point, statehood and territory follow a national principle and belong to a dual
time. If the Declaration inaugurated modernity, it also started nationalism and all
its consequences: genocides, ethnic and civil wars, ethnic cleansing, minorities,
refugees, and the stateless. The spatial principle is clear: Every state should have one
nation and every nation should have its own state – a catastrophic development for
peace as its extreme application after 1989 has shown.
The new temporal principle replaced religious eschatology with a historical tele-
ology, which promised the future suturing of humanity and nation. This teleol-
ogy has two possible variants: Either the nation imposes its rule on humanity or
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universalismundermines parochial divides and identities. Both variants were evident
when the Romans turned Stoic cosmopolitanism into the imperial legal regulation
of jus gentium. In France, the first alternative appeared in the Napoleonic Wars,
which allegedly spread the civilizing influence through conquest and occupation
(according to Hegel, Napoleon was the world spirit on horseback); the second was
the beginnings of a modern cosmopolitanism, in which slavery was abolished and
colonial people were given political rights for a limited time after the Revolution.
From the imperial deformation of Stoic cosmopolitanism to the current use of
human rights to legitimizeWestern global hegemony, every normative universalism
has decayed into imperial globalism. The split between normative and empirical
humanity resists its healing.
A gap separates universal man, the ontological principle of modernity, and
national citizen, its political instantiation and real beneficiary of rights. The nation-
state came into existence through the exclusion of other people and nations. The
modern subject reaches humanity by acquiring political rights of citizenship, which
guarantee admission to the universal human nature by excluding others from that
status. The alien as a noncitizen is the modern barbarian. She does not have rights
because she is not part of the state and she is a lesser human being because she is
not a citizen. One is human to greater or lesser degree because one is a citizen to
a greater or lesser degree. The alien is the gap between man and citizen. In our
globalized world, not to have citizenship, to be stateless or a refugee is the worst fate.
Strictly speaking human rights do not exist: If rights are given to people on account
of their humanity, then refugees, economic migrants, and prisoners in Guanta´namo
Bay and similar detention centers who have little if any legal protection should be
their main beneficiaries. As we know, however, they have very few if any rights. They
are legally abandoned, bare life, the homines sacri of the new world order.
The epochal move to the subject as the metaphysical principle of modernity is
driven and exemplified by legal personality. As species existence, the “man” of the
rights of man appears without sex, color, history, or tradition. He has no needs or
desires, an empty vessel united with all others through three abstract traits: free
will, reason, and soul – the universal elements of human essence. This minimum of
humanity allowsman to claim autonomy,moral responsibility, and legal subjectivity.
At the same time, the empirical man who actually enjoys the rights of man is a
man all too man: a well-off, heterosexual, white, urban male who condenses in his
person the abstract dignity of humanity and the real prerogatives of belonging to the
community of the powerful. Indeed, one could write the history of human rights as
the ongoing and always failing struggle to close the gap between the abstract man
and the concrete citizen: to add flesh, blood, and sex to the pale outline of the
human and extend the dignities and privileges of the powerful (the characteristics
of normative humanity) to empirical humanity. This has not happened, however,
and is unlikely to do so through the action of rights.
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Here finally, in the common frame of reference between “humanism” and “legal
humanism” we find the link between the Humanities and law. Humanism claims
that there is a universal essence of man and this essence is the attribute of each
individual who is the real subject. Linking empirical and normative humanity,
humanism marks the concern of modernity to escape cosmological or theological
determinations, to discover humanity’s worth exclusively in itself. “The humanitas
of homo humanus is determined with regard to an already established interpretation
of nature, history, world, and the ground of the world, that is, of beings as a whole.”38
By dealing with beings as a whole, however, and accepting a dominant interpretation
as absolute, humanism mistakes the transient and historically determined turn to
the subject as eternal and assigns to it absolute mastery over the natural, social, and
psychic world. This metaphysical closure is accompanied by the exclusion of those
who do not fully meet the requirements of the human essence. Classical humanism
juxtaposed the humanum to the barbarum; contemporary versions are followed by
a “double marking, of a return to half-understood Greek ideals and a gesture of
setting oneself apart from some perceived barbarism.”39 Humanism, personified by
the subject of human rights and exemplified by the academic Humanities, veers
tantalizingly and dizzyingly between an empirical globality and a normative univer-
salization, perennially excluding and subjugating those who do not meet its rigorous
standards.
Legal humanism follows closely this metaphysics and shapes the institutions of
humanism. It is the “tendency to posit man as the principle and end of every-
thing . . . for nearly all modern thinkers about law, man is the author . . . of law.”40
For legal humanism, the subject is an isolated monad with solitary consciousness
who faced with a disenchanted, threatening but also malleable world, turns to itself
as the basis for self-legislation. Legal humanism posits man as the author and end of
law. “The starting point of the science of law is Man, as soon as man is constituted
into a legal subject. The point of arrival of modern legal science is man. This sci-
ence does not move, it starts with man and ends up rediscovering the subject.”41 For
the legal mentality, the essence of humanity is the free, willing, and solitary legal
subject. The legal subject becomes the mark of humanity through the mediation
and the restraints of the posited objective legal universe.
Modern law redefined human beings as creatures of will and desire by making
rights its building blocks. There can be no positive law without the humanist legal
subject, the bearer of rights and duties; there can be no conception of rights without
38 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings, D. F. Krell, ed. (San Francisco: Harper,
1977), 201–2.
39 Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995), 90.
40 Michel Villey, “L’Humanisme et le droit,” in Seize essais de philosophie du droit (Paris: Dalloz, 1969)
60.
41 Bernard Edelman, Le Droit saisi par la photographie (Paris, Maspero, 1973) 102.
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a positive set of laws and institutions that bring the subject into existence and endow
it with the patrimony of rights. The Sovereign too is presented in the guise of a
superindividual entity with desires and powers. Sovereign and subject, positive rule
and right emerge together and presuppose one another.
Law’s subject exemplifies the dialectics of legal enlightenment: As the double gen-
itive indicates, the subject both legislates the law and is subjected to it. According
to the humanist paradox, an external constraint supports freedom. In late moder-
nity, however, autonomy recedes. The proliferation of rules and the obsession with
regulation and governance turns human relations into legal rights. Technologies of
power overwhelm the self-legislation of autonomy and the universalism of (legal)
humanism retreats.
Prolegomena for a Law and Humanities of Resistance
Human rights have expanded and are in the process of colonizing every part of daily
life. Humanity is now defined in scientific terms, whereas the normative realm has
been entrusted almost exclusively to law in the form of regulation. Law is no longer
the form or the instrument, the tool or restraint of power; it has started turning into
the very operation, the substance of power. Legal form is squeezed and undermined
by the privatization of public areas of activity and the simultaneous publicization of
domains of private action. Legal content, on the other hand, becomes coextensive
with the operations of power. As a result, law is autopoetically reproduced in a loop
of endless validity that becomes progressively devoid of sense or signification.
The global biopolitical turn has turned human rights, the moral high ground
of modern law, into an integral part of the world dispensation. Rights precede,
accompany, and legitimize the penetration of the world by neo liberal capitalism.
The gap between normative principle and its realization, underlying structure and
surface appearance, has been closing down. Immanent critique has little purchase
and the utopian dream has atrophied, chased from the public domain by those who
have the power to turn their interests and desires into normative common sense.42
To put it another way, while the law in modernity expressed both the will of a
community to live together from which it drew its normative strength and energies
as well as the structure of domination and subjection or subjectivation, precarious
as it always was, in the era of globalized capitalism this bifurcation is retreating.
Classical natural rights protected property and religion by turning them into apo-
litical institutions; the main effect of the ever-expanding reach of (human) rights
is to depoliticize politics itself. Politics is fast morphing into a type of market eco-
nomics legitimized by humanistic moralism. As an economic operation, politics has
become the terrain where negotiations and compromises are worked out, accounted
42 Russell Jacobi, The End of Utopia (New York: Routledge, 1996).
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and aggregated between groups and classes that have accepted the overall social
balance, distribution, and inequality. In the moral mode, the assumed agreement
around values and principles replaces conflict and argument, leaving large parts of
humanity unrepresented and defenseless. Law is in the process of becoming coex-
tensive with the natural life of society, mapping the social landscape by replicating
within itself the facts of social life and helping reproduce the existing order. At this
point, science becomes the dominant paradigm for legal pedagogy. Yet as the early
Nussbaum put it, “science is rarely Socratic . . . it cannot be scrutinizing its own
conceptions and foundations.”43 Justice becomes synonymous with the law (and
therefore almost redundant) and the Humanities’ civilizing mission a palliative for
the inhumanity of willing subjugation.
History has taught us that there is nothing sacred about any definition of humanity
and nothing eternal about its scope. Humanity cannot act as the a priori normative
principle and is mute in the matter of legal and moral rules. Humanity has no foun-
dation and no ends; it is the definition of groundlessness. Its metaphysical function
lies not in a philosophical essence but in its nonessence, in the incessant surprising of
the human condition and its exposure to an undecided open future. Humanity exists
as an endless process of redefinition and the necessary but impossible attempt to
escape external determination. This speculative humanity can, however, only come
forth in conflict with a subjugating legal humanism and a civilizing Humanities that
divide and discipline.
Humanity as a concept is a floating signifier without a necessary or motivated
signified.44 It is both the prerequisite of autonomy and the construct of power, dis-
cipline, and strategy. The pressing moral and political task is to develop a Human-
ities of resistance to accompany a pedagogy of justice. The stakes are no longer
or exclusively the development of the delicacy of discernment, the sharpening of
hermeneutical aptitude, or even moral edification. Adopting from the classics and
Roscoe Pound the idea of education as critique of dominant practices that divide,
dominate, and oppress, the new Humanities must commit themselves to the reasser-
tion of the principle of truth as unconditional resistance to the biopolitical turn of
post-political politics and culture. The duty to resist places the university (Law and
the Humanities) in opposition to many and great powers, which include the nation,
the state and its sovereignty, and those mediatic, ideological, religious, and cultural
forces that stop and prevent the cosmopolitanism to come.45 More generally, the law
must revive and strengthen its intimate relationship with justice, which nowadays is
explored mainly in philosophy and literature, history and art. Law does not need the
Humanities for their civilizing influence. Law is a central contributor to the project
43 Nussbaum, op. cit. fn. 12, 1640.
44 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2000) 253–61.
45 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire (London: Routledge, 2007) Ch. 12.
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of constructing the human. Against the dominant combination of Humanities, law,
and education that separates the human from the inhuman and classifies into rulers
and ruled, humanity achieves itself not as a future project of unification of the nor-
mative (civilization, culture, and liberalism) and the empirical but in overcoming
finitude and facing the infinite within historical immanence (in the here and now).
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